1

# **ACT No. 271**

HOUSE BILL NO. 298

BY REPRESENTATIVES HUGHES, BOYD, JEFFERSON, TRAVIS JOHNSON, KNOX, NELSON, AND FREEMAN

AN ACT

2	To amend and reenact Children's Code Articles 1004(A), 1004.1, 1015, 1015.1, 1016(A),			
3	1037(B), and 1039(B) and Civil Code Article 137(A), to enact Children's Code			
4	Articles 1004.2 and 1015.2, and to repeal Children's Code Article 1004(I), relative			
5	to the termination of parental rights; to provide for the authorization to file a petition			
6	for termination; to provide that the conviction and commission of a sex offense			
7	leading to the conception of the child is grounds for termination of parental rights			
8	to provide for the petitioner's right to counsel; and to provide for related matters.			
9	Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:			
10	Section 1. Children's Code Articles 1004(A), 1004.1, 1015, 1015.1, 1016(A),			
11	1037(B), and 1039(B) are hereby amended and reenacted and Children's Code Articles			
12	1004.2 and 1015.2 are hereby enacted to read as follows:			
13	Art. 1004. Petition for termination of parental rights; authorization to file			
14	A. At any time, including in any hearing in a child in need of care			
15	proceeding, the court on its own motion may order the filing of a petition on any			
16	ground authorized by Article 1015 or 1015.1.			
17	* * *			
18	Art. 1004.1. Petition for termination of parental rights; child conceived as a result			
19	of a sex offense			
20	At any time, including prior to or during an adoption proceeding, when a			
21	child is conceived as the result of the conviction or commission of a sex offense as			
22	defined in R.S. 15:541, the victim of the sex offense may petition to terminate the			

Page 1 of 7

CODING: Words in struck through type are deletions from existing law; words  $\underline{\text{underscored}}$  are additions.

rights of the perpetrator of the sex offense. Termination shall result in the loss of all parental rights of the perpetrator regarding the child, including any rights to custody, visitation, and contact, as well as any right to intervene in such action. The termination shall not affect the inheritance rights of the child. The perpetrator shall be cast in judgment for all court costs.

Art. 1004.1: 1004.2. Termination of rights; children in state custody

The department shall file and pursue to judgment in the trial court a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent or parents if the child has been in state custody for seventeen of the last twenty-two months, unless the department has documented in the case plan a compelling reason why filing is not in the best interest of the child.

\* \* \*

Art. 1015. Grounds; termination of parental rights

The grounds for termination of parental rights are:

- (1) Conviction of murder of the child's other parent.
- (2) Unjustified intentional killing of the child's other parent.
- (3) Conviction of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 by the natural parent which resulted in the conception of the child.

(4)(3) Misconduct of the parent toward this child or any other child of the parent or any other child which constitutes extreme abuse, cruel and inhuman treatment, or grossly negligent behavior below a reasonable standard of human decency, including but not limited to the conviction, commission, aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit any of the following:

- (a) Murder.
- (b) Unjustified intentional killing.
- (c) Aggravated crime against nature as defined by R.S. 14:89.1(A)(2).
- 27 (d) Rape.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

- 28 (e) Sodomy.
- 29 (f) Torture.
- 30 (g) Starvation.

1 (h) A felony that has resulted in serious bodily injury. 2 (i) Abuse or neglect which is chronic, life-threatening, or results in gravely 3 disabling physical or psychological injury or disfigurement. 4 (j) Abuse or neglect after the child is returned to the parent's care and 5 custody while under department supervision, when the child had previously been 6 removed for his safety from the parent pursuant to a disposition judgment in a child 7 in need of care proceeding. 8 (k) The parent's parental rights to one or more of the child's siblings have 9 been terminated due to neglect or abuse, prior attempts to rehabilitate the parent have 10 been unsuccessful, and the court has determined pursuant to Article 672.1, that 11 current attempts to reunite the family are not required. 12 (1) Sexual exploitation or abuse, which shall include, but is not limited to acts 13 which are prohibited by R.S. 14:43.1, 43.2, 46.3, 80, 81, 81.1, 81.2, 82.1(A)(2), 89, 14 and 89.1. 15 (m) Human trafficking when sentenced pursuant to the provisions of R.S. 16 14:46.2(B)(2) or (3). 17 (5)(4) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody of 18 a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under circumstances 19 demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibility by any of the 20 following: 21 (a) For a period of at least four months as of the time of the hearing, despite 22 a diligent search, the whereabouts of the child's parent continue to be unknown. 23 (b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to provide 24 significant contributions to the child's care and support for any period of six 25 consecutive months. 26 (c) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to maintain 27 significant contact with the child by visiting him or communicating with him for any 28 period of six consecutive months. 29 (6)(5) Unless sooner permitted by the court, at least one year has elapsed 30 since a child was removed from the parent's custody pursuant to a court order; there

has been no substantial parental compliance with a case plan for services which has been previously filed by the department and approved by the court as necessary for the safe return of the child; and despite earlier intervention, there is no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the parent's condition or conduct in the near future, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home.

(7)(6) The child is in the custody of the department pursuant to a court order or placement by the parent; the parent has been convicted and sentenced to a period of incarceration of such duration that the parent will not be able to care for the child for an extended period of time, considering the child's age and his need for a safe, stable, and permanent home; and despite notice by the department, the parent has refused or failed to provide a reasonable plan for the appropriate care of the child other than foster care.

(8)(7) The relinquishment of an infant pursuant to Chapter 13 of Title XI of this Code.

(9) The commission of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 by the natural parent which resulted in the conception of the child.

(10)(8) The child is in the custody of the department pursuant to a court order for at least one year, unless sooner permitted by the court, and the identity of the child's father remains unknown and all the following have occurred:

- (a) In the course of investigating the case and providing services to the family the department has been unable to learn the identity of the father.
- (b) No party to the proceedings or the mother, if not a party, is able to provide a first and last name of a putative father or alias sufficient to provide a reasonable possibility of identification and location.
  - (c) The department has obtained all of the following:
- (i) A certified copy of the child's birth certificate with no one indicated thereon as the father of the child, or the father listed has been determined not to be the biological father of the child.

1 (ii) A recent certificate from the putative father registry indicating that no 2 person is listed or registered as the child's father. 3 (iii) A recent certificate from the clerk of court in the parish in which the 4 child was born indicating that no acknowledgment with respect to this child has been 5 recorded. 6 Art. 1015.1. Grounds; termination of parental rights of perpetrator of a sex offense 7 Parental rights of a natural parent may be terminated in cases where there is 8 a conviction or commission of a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541 by that natural 9 parent which resulted in the conception of the child. 10 Art. 1015.1. 1015.2. Termination of parental rights, certain grounds; costs and fees 11 A. A petitioner shall not be required to prepay nor be cast with court costs 12 or costs of service or subpoena for the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 13 1015(3) or (9) 1015.1. The clerk of court shall immediately file and process the 14 petition, regardless of the ability of the petitioner to pay court costs. 15 B. All court costs, attorney fees, costs of enforcement and modification 16 proceedings, costs of appeals, evaluation fees, and expert witness fees incurred in 17 filing, maintaining, or defending any proceeding under Article 1015(3) or (9) 1015.1 18 shall be paid by the perpetrator of the sex offense, including all costs of medical and 19 psychological care for the sexually abused adult, or for the child conceived as a 20 result of the sex offense. 21 Art. 1016. Right to counsel 22 A.(1) The child and the identified parent shall each have the right to be 23 represented by separate counsel in a termination proceeding brought in accordance with this Title. Neither the child nor anyone purporting to act on behalf of the child 24 25 may be permitted to waive the child's right to counsel. 26 (2) For actions brought under Article 1015.1, the court shall have discretion 27 to decide under the circumstances for each case whether to appoint counsel for the 28 child. In no event shall the petitioner of such action or the minor child be required 29 to interact with the respondent as a condition to pursue termination under this

Article. Any counsel acting on behalf of the child shall not require a petitioner to

30

1	make the child available for any visitation or conversation with the respondent or the
2	respondent's family and shall not require any nonoffending petitioner to take classes
3	or provide updates on the child. A petitioner shall have the right to seek an
4	expedited suspensive appeal for any violation of this Article.
5	* * *
6	Art. 1037. Findings and contents of termination judgment; form
7	* * *
8	B.(1) When the court finds that the alleged grounds set out in any Paragraph
9	of Article 1015 or 1015.1 are proven by the evidentiary standards required by Article
10	1035 and that it is in the best interests of the child, it shall order the termination of
11	the parental rights of the parent against whom the allegations are proven. The court
12	shall enter written findings on both issues. The consideration of best interests of the
13	child shall include consideration of the child's attachment to his current caretakers.
14	(2) When the grounds for termination set forth in Article 1015.1 have been
15	established, it shall be considered in the best interests of the child for the parental
16	rights of the perpetrator to be terminated.
17	* * *
18	Art. 1039. Other dispositions
19	* * *
20	$B.\underline{(1)}$ If the court finds that the alleged grounds are not proven in accordance
21	with the evidentiary standards set forth in Article 1035 or if the court finds that
22	termination of parental rights is not in the best interests of the child, it shall enter
23	written findings on both issues and may:
24	$\frac{(1)}{(a)}$ Dismiss the petition.
25	(2)(b) Reinstate the parent to full care and custody of the child.
26	(3)(c) If the child has been previously adjudicated as a child in need of care,
27	reinstate that proceeding pursuant to Title VI.
28	(4)(d) Upon a showing of sufficient facts, adjudicate the child in need of care
29	in accordance with Title VI.

1 (5)(e) Upon a showing of sufficient facts, adjudicate the family in need of 2 services in accordance with Title VII. 3  $\frac{(6)(f)}{(6)}$  Make any other disposition that is in the best interest of the child. 4 (2) In actions based on Article 1015.1, if the court finds the alleged grounds 5 are not proven, then any determination of custody, visitation, contact, and all other 6 parental rights of the alleged perpetrator shall be determined in a separate action 7 independent of the termination proceeding. 8 9 Section 2. Civil Code Article 137(A) is hereby amended and reenacted to read as 10 follows: 11 Art. 137. Denial of visitation; felony rape sex offense; death of a parent 12 A. In a proceeding in which visitation of a child is being sought by a parent, 13 if the child was conceived through the commission of a felony rape sex offense as 14 provided by R.S. 15:541, the parent who committed the <del>felony rape</del> sex offense shall 15 be denied visitation rights and contact with the child. 16 17 Section 3. Children's Code Article 1004(I) is hereby repealed in its entirety. 18 Section 4. This Act shall become effective upon signature by the governor or, if not 19 signed by the governor, upon expiration of the time for bills to become law without signature 20 by the governor, as provided by Article III, Section 18 of the Constitution of Louisiana. If 21 vetoed by the governor and subsequently approved by the legislature, this Act shall become 22 effective on the day following such approval. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA APPROVED: \_\_\_\_

Page 7 of 7

2023 Regular Session

# **ACT No. 401**

HOUSE BILL NO. 176

1

# BY REPRESENTATIVE JEFFERSON

(On Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute)

AN ACT

2	To amend and reenact Civil Code Article 525 and to enact Civil Code Article 520, relative	
3	to transfer of ownership of movable property; to provide for transfer of ownership	
4	by merchants; to provide for the effect of various provisions of the Civil Code; to	
5	provide for registered movables; and to provide for related matters.	
6	Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:	
7	Section 1. Civil Code Article 525 is hereby amended and reenacted and Civil Code	
8	Article 520 is hereby enacted to read as follows:	
9	Art. 520. Transfer of ownership by merchant	
10	Except as otherwise provided by legislation, a transferee in good faith and for	
11	fair value acquires ownership of a corporeal movable from a transferor who is not	
12	the owner only if the transferor has possession of the thing with consent of the	
13	owner, is a merchant customarily selling similar things, and transfers the thing in the	
14	regular course of the transferor's business.	
15	Revision Comments - 2023	
16 17 18 19	(a) This provision is new. It sets forth a limited exception to the rule that the transfer of a thing of another does not convey ownership. See Article 2452. It does so by formulating a rule that is consistent with the doctrine of entrustment found in the Uniform Commercial Code. See U.C.C. Sections 2-403(2) and 2A-305(2). The	

Page 1 of 4

CODING: Words in  $\frac{\text{struck through}}{\text{struck through}}$  type are deletions from existing law; words  $\frac{\text{underscored}}{\text{are additions}}$ .

HB NO. 176 ENROLLED

rule formulated by this Article is also consistent with the French doctrine of *la possession vaut titre*, but only as applied to certain transfers. See French Civil Code Article 2276. The purpose of this Article is to protect a good faith purchaser for value who acquires a movable from a transferor who has possession of the thing with the owner's consent, but only when the transferor is a merchant customarily selling similar things and the transfer is in the regular course of the transferor's business.

- (b) The protection that this Article affords to a transferee of a movable in good faith, for fair value, and in the regular course of business is similar to the protections afforded to a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" as that term is used in the Uniform Commercial Code. See R.S. 10:1-201(b)(9); U.C.C. Sections 1-201(b)(9) and 2A-103(1)(a). Under that definition, neither a dation en paiement nor a transfer in bulk is a sale to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Similarly, under this Article, neither a dation en paiement nor a transfer in bulk is a sale in the regular course of the transferor's business.
- (c) Louisiana courts have, in the past, occasionally applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar an owner's action for revendication against a good faith purchaser of a movable who purchased it from a person to whom the owner voluntarily delivered possession. According to that jurisprudence, the owner who clothes the possessor with every possible indicium of ownership must bear the loss when the possessor transfers the thing to a good faith purchaser. Theriac v. McKeever, 405 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1981); James v. Judice, 140 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1962); Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d 477 (La. 1957); William Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 52 So. 131 (La. 1909). While the courts' use of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is in line with the Uniform Commercial Code's entrustment doctrine and the French principle of *la possession vaut titre*, the approach formulated by this Article is more predictable than the prior jurisprudence. This Article displaces the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this context by declaring that, except as otherwise provided by legislation, one who has possession of a corporeal movable with the owner's consent may transfer its ownership to another only if the requirements of this Article are met.
- (d) The requirement that the transferor have possession with the owner's consent negates the application of this Article to lost or stolen things. The owner's right to recover lost or stolen things from a possessor is governed by Articles 521 and 524.
- (e) In the absence of a rule like the one set forth in this Article, Louisiana courts have erroneously applied Article 524, which by its very terms applies only to lost or stolen movables, to the transfer of a movable by a person who has possession of the thing with the owner's consent. See Livestock Producers, Inc. v. Littleton, 748 So. 2d 537 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1999); Louisiana Lift & Equipment, Inc. v. Eizel, 770 So. 2d 859 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2000). Unless otherwise provided by legislation, if the requirements of this Article are not satisfied, the transfer of a corporeal movable by a person who has possession of it with the owner's consent does not transfer ownership, and the owner may recover the movable from the transferee without reimbursing the purchase price, even if the transferee is in good faith.
- (f) This Article does not affect the law of mandate. Quite apart from this provision, a mandatary in possession of a corporeal movable belonging to the principal may have actual or apparent authority to transfer its ownership to another.

48 \* \* \*

HB NO. 176 ENROLLED

Art. 525. Registered movables.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

The provisions of this Chapter do not apply to movables that are Movables required by law to be registered in public records are subject to the provisions of this Chapter.

#### Revision Comments - 2023

This provision fills a gap in the law. Former Article 525 declared: "The provisions of this Chapter do not apply to movables that are required by law to be registered in public records." However, neither the former article nor any other provision stated in the affirmative what law governed transfers of registered movables in lieu of this Chapter. Although sellers of motor vehicles are required to comply with the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law, R.S. 32:701 et seq., the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law does not contain provisions addressing the transfer of ownership of motor vehicles. Louisiana courts have held consistently that the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law does not require transfer of the certificate of title to a vehicle in order for the sale to be a valid one and that the sale of a vehicle is not affected by non-compliance with the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law. Transportation Equipment Co. v. Dabdoub, 69 So. 2d 640 (La. Ct. App. 1954); Flatte v. Nichols, 96 So. 2d 477 (La. 1957); Shanks v. Callahan, 232 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1969); Tarver v. Tarver, 242 So. 2 374 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1970); Robinson v. Jackson, 255 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1971); Theriac v. McKeever, 405 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1981); Wright v. Barnes, 541 So. 2d 977 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1989); Maloney v. State Farm Ins. Co., 583 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1991); Biggs v. Prewitt, 669 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1995); Lambert v. Ray Brandt Dodge, Inc., 31 So. 3d 1108 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, failure to comply with the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law is not without consequence. For example, the purchaser's failure to obtain a certificate of title to the vehicle in accordance with the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law prevents the purchaser from acquiring a "marketable" title." R.S. 32:706. In addition, a person's knowing failure to comply with disclosure provisions of the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law may expose that person to criminal

1	and/or civil liability. See, e.g., R.S. 32:706.1. Notwithstanding those and other	
2	obligations imposed by the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law upon parties involved	
3	in the transfer of vehicles, the provisions of this Chapter govern the transfer of	
4	ownership of such vehicles.	
	SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	
	PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE	
	GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA	

**ENROLLED** 

HB NO. 176

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

2023 Regular Session

# **ACT No. 421**

HOUSE BILL NO. 220

# BY REPRESENTATIVE PRESSLY

(On Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute)

1	AN ACT		
2	To amend and reenact Civil Code Articles 531 and 3440 and Code of Civil Procedure		
3	Articles 1061, 3651, 3653 through 3655, 3656(A), 3657 through 3662, and 3669,		
4	relative to actions to determine ownership or possession; to provide with respect to		
5	petitory actions, possessory actions, actions for declaratory judgments to determine		
6	ownership, and similar proceedings; to provide for proof of ownership of		
7	immovables; to provide with respect to precarious possession; to provide for		
8	reconventional demands; to provide with respect to cumulation of actions; to provide		
9	with respect to disturbances in fact and in law; to provide with respect to possession		
10	and admissibility of title; to provide for relief and appeals; and to provide for related		
11	matters.		
12	Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:		
13	Section 1. Civil Code Articles 531 and 3440 are hereby amended and reenacted to		
14	read as follows:		
15	Art. 531. Proof of ownership of immovable.		
16	One who claims claiming the ownership of an immovable against another		
17	who has been in possession of the immovable for one year after having commenced		
18	possession in good faith and with just title or who has been in possession of the		
19	immovable for ten years must shall prove that he has acquired ownership from a		
20	previous owner or by acquisitive prescription. If neither party is in possession In all		
21	other cases, he need only prove a better title.		

CODING: Words in  $\frac{\text{struck through}}{\text{struck through}}$  type are deletions from existing law; words  $\frac{\text{underscored}}{\text{are additions}}$ .

#### Revision Comments - 2023

1

42

43

2 (a) The 2023 revision of this Article changes substantially the burden of 3 proof imposed upon a person claiming the ownership of an immovable against 4 another who is in possession. Prior to the revision, this Article provided that in such 5 cases, the claimant's burden of proof was to prove that he had acquired ownership 6 from a prior owner or by acquisitive prescription. This burden of proof, which has 7 often been characterized as the requirement of proving "title good against the world," 8 applied even when the defendant was a usurper who had no title at all. See Pure Oil 9 Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974). Application of that rule could lead to 10 obvious inequities by allowing a usurper who was in possession for only one year to 11 prevail against a party who might have been in possession for many years previously 12 under a title that suffered from only minor defects. See Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 13 So. 2d 797, 799 (La. 1974) (Summers, J., dissenting). 14 (b) The 2023 revision narrows the circumstances in which the person 15 claiming ownership must prove that he acquired ownership from a prior owner or by 16 acquisitive prescription. As revised, the Article provides that this onerous burden 17 of proof applies only when the defendant has been in possession for one year after 18 having commenced possession in good faith and with just title or when the defendant 19 has been in possession for ten years, regardless of whether in good faith or with just 20 title. Where neither of these circumstances applies, the burden imposed upon the 21 claimant is merely to prove a better title than that of the defendant. 22 (c) The good faith and just title mentioned in this Article are identical to the 23 good faith and just title necessary to start the running of the acquisitive prescription 24 of ten years under Article 3475. "Good faith" is used in this Article with the 25 meaning given in Articles 3480 and 3481. By the express wording of this Article, 26 the defendant's good faith is measured only at the commencement of his possession. 27 This is analogous to the rule that applies under Article 3482 for purposes of the 28 accrual of the acquisitive prescription of ten years. 29 (d) The 2023 revision does not change the rule that a common author in title 30 is presumed to be the previous owner. See Article 532; Weaver v. Hailey, 416 So. 31 2d 311 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1982). The presumption is rebuttable. See Article 532, 32 comment (b). 33 34 Art. 3440. Protection of precarious possession 35 Where there is a disturbance of possession, the possessory action is available 36 to a precarious possessor, such as a lessee or a depositary, against anyone except the 37 person for whom he possesses. 38 Section 2. Code of Civil Procedure Articles 1061, 3651, 3653 through 3655, 39 3656(A), 3657 through 3662, and 3669 are hereby amended and reenacted to read as 40 follows: 41 Art. 1061. Actions pleaded in reconventional demand; compulsory

Page 2 of 13

A. The defendant in the principal action may assert in a reconventional

demand any causes of action which he that the defendant may have against the

plaintiff in the principal action, even if these two parties are domiciled in the same parish and regardless of connexity between the principal and reconventional demands.

B. The defendant in the principal action, Except as otherwise provided in Article 3657, and except in an action for divorce under Civil Code Article 102 or 103 or in an action under Civil Code Article 186, the defendant in the principal action shall assert in a reconventional demand all causes of action that he the defendant may have against the plaintiff that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the principal action.

\* \* \*

#### Art. 3651. Petitory action

The petitory action is one brought by a person who claims the ownership of, but who is not in possession does not have the right to possess, of immovable property or of a real right therein, against another who is in possession or who claims the ownership thereof adversely, to obtain judgment recognizing the plaintiff's ownership.

#### Comments - 2023

According to the Civil Code, possession is a matter of fact, but the right to possess arises from possession for over a year and, once acquired, is lost if the possessor is evicted and does not recover possession within one year of the eviction. Civil Code Articles 3422 and 3434. For purposes of this Chapter, Code of Civil Procedure Article 3660 defines "possession" as possession in fact, rather than the right to possess, but this Article, among others, used the term "in possession" where the right to possess, rather than factual possession, was intended. The 2023 revision of this Article clarifies that a petitory action is brought by one who does not have the right to possess. A person who still has the right to possess even though he might have lost actual possession within the past year should bring a possessory action against the person who evicted him, rather than a petitory action under this Article.

\* \* \*

# Art. 3653. Same; proof of title; immovable

<u>A.</u> To obtain a judgment recognizing his ownership of immovable property or real right therein, the plaintiff in a petitory action shall:

(1) Prove that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription, if the court finds that the defendant is has been in possession

### Page 3 of 13

thereof; or for one year after having commenced possession in good faith and with
just title or that the defendant has been in possession for ten years.

(2) Prove a better title thereto than the defendant, if the court finds that the

latter is not in possession thereof in all other cases.

<u>B.</u> When the titles of the parties are traced to a common author, he the common author is presumed to be the previous owner.

#### Comments - 2023

- (a) The 2023 revision of this Article changes substantially the burden of proof imposed upon the plaintiff in a petitory action when the defendant has the right to possess. Prior to the revision, this Article provided that, if the defendant in a petitory action was in possession, the plaintiff's burden of proof was to prove that he had acquired ownership from a prior owner or by acquisitive prescription. This burden of proof, which has often been characterized as the requirement of proving "title good against the world," applied even when the defendant was a usurper who had no title at all. See Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797 (La. 1974). Application of that rule could lead to obvious inequities by allowing a usurper who was in possession for only one year to prevail in a petitory action against a party who might have been in possession for many years previously under a title that suffered from only minor defects. See Pure Oil Co. v. Skinner, 294 So. 2d 797, 799 (La. 1974) (Summers, J., dissenting).
- (b) The 2023 revision narrows the circumstances in which the plaintiff in a petitory action must prove that he acquired ownership from a prior owner or by acquisitive prescription. As revised, the Article provides that this onerous burden of proof applies only when the defendant has been in possession for one year after having commenced possession in good faith and with just title or when the defendant has been in possession for ten years, regardless of whether in good faith or with just title. Where neither of these circumstances applies, the plaintiff's burden in the petitory action is merely to prove a better title than that of the defendant.
- (c) The good faith and just title mentioned in this Article are identical to the good faith and just title necessary to start the running of the acquisitive prescription of ten years under Civil Code Article 3475. "Good faith" is used in this Article with the meaning given in Civil Code Articles 3480 and 3481. By the express wording of this Article, the defendant's good faith is measured only at the commencement of his possession. This is analogous to the rule that applies under Civil Code Article 3482 for purposes of the accrual of the acquisitive prescription of ten years.
- (d) The 2023 revision does not change the rule that a common author in title is presumed to be the previous owner. See Civil Code Article 532; Weaver v. Hailey, 416 So. 2d 311 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1982). The presumption is rebuttable. See Civil Code Article 532, comment (b).
- (e) Prior to its 2023 revision, this Article contained another example of the use of the term "possession" with a meaning different from that given to the term in Article 3660. See, e.g., Griffin v. Daigle, 769 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2000) (explaining that the words "in possession" as formerly used in this Article required that the defendant have had corporeal possession for at least one year or civil possession for the same period of time preceded by corporeal possession). This inconsistency in terminology was eliminated in the 2023 revision.

Art. 3654. Proof of title in action for declaratory judgment, concursus, expropriation, or similar proceeding

When the issue of ownership of immovable property or of a real right therein is presented in an action for a declaratory judgment, or in a concursus, expropriation, or similar proceeding, or when the issue of the ownership of funds that are deposited in the registry of the court and which that belong to the owner of the immovable property or of the real right therein is so presented, the court shall render judgment in favor of the party as follows:

- (1) Who If the party who would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right therein in a possessory action has been in possession for one year after having commenced possession in good faith and with just title or has been in possession for ten years, the court shall render judgment in favor of that party, unless the adverse party proves that he has acquired ownership from a previous owner or by acquisitive prescription; or would be entitled to a judgment recognizing his ownership in a petitory action under Article 3653(A)(1).
- (2) Who In all other cases, the court shall render judgment in favor of the party who proves better title to the immovable property or real right therein, when neither party would be entitled to the possession of the immovable property or real right therein in a possessory action.

## Comments - 2023

The 2023 revisions to this Article are intended to conform the burden of proof in a declaratory judgment action or other proceeding in which ownership is at issue to the burden of proof that applies under revised Article 3653 in a petitory action. As with a petitory action, if one party has been in possession for one year after having commenced possession in good faith and with just title or has been in possession for ten years, even in the absence of good faith or just title, that party will prevail, unless the adverse party proves that he acquired ownership from a prior owner or by acquisitive prescription.

#### Art. 3655. Possessory action

The possessory action is one brought by the possessor <u>or precarious possessor</u> of immovable property or of a real right therein to be maintained in his possession of the property or enjoyment of the right when he has been disturbed, or to be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has been evicted.

Comments -	2023
Comments -	202

The 2023 revision of this Article recognizes and complements a previous amendment to the Civil Code granting a precarious possessor, such as a lessee, the right to bring a possessory action against anyone other than the person for whom the precarious possessor possesses. See Civil Code Article 3440.

Art. 3656. Same; parties; venue

A. A plaintiff in a possessory action shall may be brought by one who possesses for himself. A person entitled to the use or usufruct of immovable property, and one who owns a real right therein, possesses for himself. A predial lessee possessory action may also be brought by a precarious possessor against anyone except the person for whom he possesses for and in the name of his lessor, and not for himself.

\* \* \*

#### Comments - 2023

(a) The 2023 revision of this Article recognizes and complements a previous amendment to the Civil Code granting a precarious possessor, such as a lessee, the right to bring a possessory action against anyone other than the person for whom the precarious possessor possesses. See Civil Code Article 3440.

(b) The statement in this Article that a usufructuary possesses for himself means that the usufructuary has standing to bring a possessory action and does not imply that a usufructuary can prescribe against the naked owner without taking the steps required to terminate precarious possession under Civil Code Articles 3439 and 3478.

Art. 3657. Same; cumulation with petitory action prohibited or declaratory judgment action; conversion into or separate petitory action by defendant reconventional demand or separate suit asserting ownership or title

A. The plaintiff may shall not cumulate the possessory action with either the petitory and the possessory actions in the same suit or plead them in the alternative, and when he does so he waives the possessory action or a declaratory judgment action to determine ownership. If the plaintiff brings does so, the possessory action, and without dismissing it and prior to judgment therein institutes the petitory action, the possessory action is abated does not abate, but the defendant may object to the cumulation by asserting a dilatory exception. If, before executory judgment in the possessory action, the plaintiff institutes the petitory action or a declaratory judgment action in a separate suit, the possessory action abates.

### Page 6 of 13

<u>B.</u> When, except as provided in Article 3661(1)-(3), the defendant in a possessory action asserts title in himself, in the alternative or otherwise, he the defendant does not thereby converts the suit convert the possessory action into a petitory action, and judicially confesses or judicially confess the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action, but the defendant's assertions of title shall be considered in defense of the possessory action only for the purposes stated in Article 3661(B).

C. Unless the plaintiff in the possessory action seeks an adjudication of his ownership, the defendant shall not file a reconventional demand asserting a petitory action or declaratory judgment action to determine ownership. If, before executory judgment in a possessory action, the defendant therein institutes a petitory action or a declaratory judgment action to determine ownership in a separate suit he files against the plaintiff in the possessory action, the plaintiff defendant in the petitory possessory action judicially confesses the possession of the defendant therein plaintiff in the possessory action.

# Comments - 2023

- (a) The 2023 amendment of this Article preserves the rule of noncumulation of the possessory and petitory actions and expands the rule to prohibit cumulation of the possessory action with a declaratory judgment action to determine ownership. At the same time, the amendment lessens the consequences for the plaintiff of an improper cumulation and eliminates the judicial confession of the plaintiff's possession that previously arose from the defendant's assertions of title in a possessory action.
- (b) Prior to the 2023 amendment of this Article, if the plaintiff cumulated the possessory action with the petitory action, the possessory action simply abated. Under the revised Article, when the plaintiff cumulates the possessory action with a petitory action or with a declaratory judgment action to determine ownership, the possessory action does not abate, but the defendant has the right to object to the improper cumulation by filing a dilatory exception. See Article 926(A)(7). Upon sustaining the exception, the court may order separate trials or may order the plaintiff to elect which action he desires to pursue, as provided in Articles 464 and 465. If not raised through a timely dilatory exception, the objection of improper cumulation is waived. See Article 926(B).
- (c) If, rather than cumulating the possessory action with a petitory or declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff in the possessory action files a separate action to determine ownership while the possessory action is pending, the possessory action abates, but the plaintiff by doing so makes no confession of the defendant's possession.

1 (d) Prior to the 2023 revision, the consequences for a defendant who asserted 2 title in himself in response to a possessory action were grave. Not only did his 3 assertions of title convert the possessory action into a petitory action in which he 4 became the plaintiff, but they also constituted a judicial confession of the other 5 party's possession, thus triggering the onerous burden under Article 3653 of proving 6 title good against the world. This harsh penalty has been removed. The defendant's 7 assertions of title in a possessory action no longer convert the action into a petitory 8 action or constitute a judicial confession of the plaintiff's possession; however, the 9 defendant's assertions of title are considered in defense of the possessory action only 10 for the limited purposes specified in Article 3661(B)(1) through (3). Thus, the defendant cannot divert the focus of a possessory action from the issue of possession 11 12 to the often more complicated issue of ownership through the simple expedient of 13 injecting issues of ownership in his pleadings. 14 (e) Unless the plaintiff in a possessory action has sought an adjudication of 15 his ownership, the defendant is not permitted to assert a claim of ownership by 16

(e) Unless the plaintiff in a possessory action has sought an adjudication of his ownership, the defendant is not permitted to assert a claim of ownership by reconvention. If the defendant asserts ownership by instituting a separate suit before judgment in the possessory action becomes executory, he judicially confesses the possession of the plaintiff in the possessory action. This judicial confession does not arise, however, if it is the plaintiff in the possessory action who institutes the separate suit to determine ownership while the possessory action is pending and the defendant reconvenes in that separate suit to assert his own claim of ownership.

### Art. 3658. Same; requisites

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

To maintain the possessory action the possessor must plaintiff shall allege and prove that all of the following:

- (1) He The plaintiff had possession or precarious possession of the immovable property or real right therein at the time the disturbance occurred;
- (2) He The plaintiff and his ancestors in title, or the person for whom the plaintiff possesses precariously and that person's ancestors in title, had such possession quietly and without interruption for more than a year immediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force or fraud;.
- (3) The disturbance was one in fact or in law, as defined in Article 3659; and.
  - (4) The possessory action was instituted within a year of the disturbance.

#### Comments - 2023

The 2023 amendments to this Article recognize that a precarious possessor may bring a possessory action. The precarious possessor himself need not have exercised his precarious possession for a full year prior to the disturbance; it suffices if the person for whom he possesses precariously, or that person's ancestors in title, have had possession for a year.

1	Art. 3659. Same; disturbance in fact and in law defined
2	A. Disturbances of possession which that give rise to the possessory action
3	are of two kinds: disturbance in fact and disturbance in law.
4	B. A disturbance in fact is an eviction, or any other physical act which that
5	prevents the possessor of immovable property or of a real right therein from enjoying
6	his possession quietly, or which that throws any obstacle in the way of that
7	enjoyment.
8	C. A disturbance in law is the occurrence or existence of any of the
9	following adversely to the possessor of immovable property or a real right therein:
10	(1) The execution, recordation, or registry, or continuing existence of record
11	after the possessor or his ancestors in title acquired the right to possess, of any
12	instrument which that asserts or implies a right of ownership or right to the
13	possession of the immovable property or of a real right therein, or any.
14	(2) The continuing existence of record of any instrument that asserts or
15	implies a right of ownership or right to the possession of the immovable property or
16	a real right therein, unless the instrument was recorded before the possessor and his
17	ancestors in title commenced possession.
18	(3) Any other claim or pretension of ownership or right to the possession
19	thereof of the immovable property or a real right therein, whether written or oral,
20	except when asserted in an action or proceeding, adversely to the possessor of such
21	property or right.
22	Comments - 2023
23 24 25 26	(a) The 2023 amendments to this Article clarify when a disturbance in law must arise, in relation to the time that the plaintiff enters into possession or acquires the right to possess, in order for the disturbance to form the basis of a possessory action.
27 28 29 30 31 32	(b) Under Subparagraph (C)(1) of this Article, the plaintiff in a possessory action or his ancestors in title must have acquired the right to possess before the execution, recordation, or registry of an instrument that is claimed to constitute a disturbance in law. Thus, the plaintiff cannot complain that a previously recorded instrument, such as a prior conveyance in favor of the defendant, constitutes a disturbance in law of his possession. Similarly, under Subparagraph (C)(2), the

ancestors in title commenced possession.

33

34

35

continuing existence of record of an adverse instrument does not constitute a

disturbance in law if the instrument was recorded before the possessor and his

(c) The temporal difference between Subparagraph (C)(1) (which refers to the time the plaintiff acquired the right to possess) and Subparagraph (C)(2) (which refers to the earlier point in time at which the plaintiff commenced possession) is intentional. Until the plaintiff has been in possession for one year, he is not entitled to complain of any kind of disturbance in law. After the one-year period has accrued, the plaintiff is entitled to complain of the execution and recordation of new adverse instruments, as Subparagraph (C)(1) provides, and may also complain of the continuing existence of record of instruments that were recorded during that one-year period and that, on account of their continuing existence of record after the accrual of the one-year period, constitute a continuing disturbance of his possession. In no event is the plaintiff permitted to claim that an instrument recorded before he commenced possession is a disturbance of his possession.

(d) The reason that the continuing existence of record of an adverse instrument constitutes a distinct disturbance in law is to prevent a possessor from losing the right to complain of an instrument that was recorded after he commenced possession but more than one year before he brings the possessory action. Without such a rule, his right to bring the possessory action would be lost under Article 3658(4) for failure to institute the action within one year of the recordation of the instrument, even though he may have had no reason to suspect than an adverse instrument had been recorded. Because the continuing existence of record is a continuing disturbance, the one-year prescriptive period under Article 3658(4) for bringing a possessory action complaining of this disturbance in law effectively does not commence to run under these circumstances. See Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., Inc. v. Lemoine, 381 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1980). See also Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 260 So. 2d 307, 313 (La. 1972) (Tate, J., concurring).

Art. 3660. Same; possession

<u>A.</u> A person is in possession of immovable property or of a real right therein, within the intendment of the articles of this Chapter, when <u>he the person</u> has the corporeal possession thereof, or civil possession thereof preceded by corporeal possession by him or his ancestors in title, and possesses for himself <u>or precariously</u> for another, whether in good or bad faith, or even as a usurper.

<u>B.</u> Subject to the provisions of Articles 3656 and 3664, a person who claims the ownership of immovable property or of a real right therein possesses through his lessee, through another who occupies the property or enjoys the right under an agreement with him or his lessee, or through a person who has the use or usufruct thereof to which his right of ownership is subject.

### Comments - 2023

The 2023 amendment of this Article retains the rule that, for purposes of this Chapter, "possession" means possession in fact, rather than the right to possess, except where the right to possess is expressly stated. Consistent with the changes made to Articles 3655, 3656, and 3658, the amended Article recognizes that precarious possession for another person constitutes possession for purposes of this Chapter.

1	Art. 3661. Same; title not at issue; limited admissibility of evidence of title
2	A. In the possessory action, the ownership or title of the parties to the
3	immovable property or real right therein is not at issue.
4	B. No evidence of ownership or title to the immovable property or real right
5	therein shall be admitted except to prove any of the following:
6	(1) The possession thereof by a party as owner;.
7	(2) The extent of the possession thereof by a party; or and his ancestors in
8	<u>title.</u>
9	(3) The length of time in which a party and his ancestors in title have had
10	possession thereof.
11	Comments - 2023
12 13 14 15	The 2023 amendment to this Article clarifies that a person is entitled to use evidence of ownership for purposes of proving not only the extent of his own possession, but also the extent of possession of his ancestors in title. See Civil Code Article 3442.
16	Art. 3662. Same; relief which that may be granted successful plaintiff in judgment;
17	appeal
18	A. A judgment rendered for the plaintiff in a possessory action shall:
19	(1) Recognize his the plaintiff's right to the possession of the immovable
20	property or real right therein, and restore him to possession thereof if he has been
21	evicted, or maintain him in possession thereof if the disturbance has not been an
22	eviction;.
23	(2) Order the defendant to assert his adverse claim of ownership of the
24	immovable property or real right therein in a petitory action to be filed within a delay
25	to be fixed by the court not to exceed sixty days after the date the judgment becomes
26	executory, or be precluded thereafter from asserting the ownership thereof, if the
27	plaintiff has prayed for such this relief and this relief is not precluded by Paragraph
28	B of this Article.; and
29	(3) Award him the plaintiff the damages to which he is entitled and for
30	which he has prayed for.

1	B. A judgment in a possessory action shall not grant the relief described in
2	Subparagraph (A)(2) of this Article against the state or against a defendant who
3	appeared in the action only through an attorney appointed to represent him under
4	Article 5091.
5	<u>C.</u> A suspensive appeal from the judgment rendered in a possessory action
6	may be taken within the delay provided in Article 2123, and a devolutive appeal may
7	be taken from such the judgment only within thirty days of the applicable date
8	provided in Article 2087(A).
9	Comments - 2023
10	(a) A man made a substantion about a substantial bands 2022 maining
10	(a) Among the substantive changes made to this Article by the 2023 revision,
11	Subparagraph (A)(2) provides that the delay within which the losing defendant can
12 13	be ordered to file a petitory action, where that relief was prayed for by the prevailing
13 14	plaintiff, is fixed in all cases at sixty days. This relief is not available against a
15	defendant who appeared in the action only through an attorney appointed to represent him under Article 5091. Nevertheless, the prevailing plaintiff is not without a
16	remedy to obtain a determination of ownership when the defendant has appeared in
17	the possessory action in that manner; the plaintiff can institute his own declaratory
18	judgment action against the defendant and, depending on the circumstances, may be
10	judgment action against the detendant and, depending on the encumstances, may be

(b) The 2023 revision removes the constitutional infirmity in this Article noted by the Supreme Court in Todd v. State, through Dept. of Natural Resources, 456 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1983), amended 474 So. 2d 430 (La. 1985), in which the court held that, although a possessory action can be brought against the state, the relief allowed under Subparagraph (A)(2) of this Article is a form of liberative prescription that cannot run against the state under Article XII, Section 13 of the Constitution of Louisiana.

entitled to have an attorney again appointed to defend the absentee defendant in the

(c) A judgment rendered in violation of Paragraph B of this Article is subject to annulment under Article 2004.

30 \* \* \*

declaratory judgment action.

Art. 3669. Possessory action unavailable between owner of mineral servitude and owner of dependent mineral royalty

In the event of a dispute between the owner of a mineral servitude and the owner of a mineral royalty burdening or alleged to burden the servitude in question, the possessory action is unavailable to either party, and the only available real action is the petitory action. The burden of proof on the plaintiff in such an the petitory action is that which must be borne by the plaintiff in a petitory action when neither party is in possession to prove a better title than that of the defendant.

L		Comments - 2023
2 3 4 5	Prior to its revision in 2023, this Article provided that the plaintiff's burder of proof in a petitory action contemplated by this Article was that which applie when neither party is in possession. Rather than following this indirect approach, the 2023 revision states more plainly and directly what the burden of proof is in such a action: it is to prove a better title.	
		SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
		PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
		GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
1	APPROVED:	

**ENROLLED** 

HB NO. 220